Surrender and subjectivity:Merleau-Ponty and Patočka on intersubjectivity by Evink, Eddo
  




Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology and Practical Philosophy
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2013
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Evink, E. (2013). Surrender and subjectivity: Merleau-Ponty and Patočka on intersubjectivity. Meta:
Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology and Practical Philosophy, 5(1), 13-28.
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019




META: RESEARCH IN HERMENEUTICS, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 




Surrender and Subjectivity: 








In Jan Patočka’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity one can find clear 
influences of  Merleau-Ponty. By both philosophers intersubjectivity is seen 
as a form of reversibility that has a primacy above personal subjectivity. But 
Patočka adds to this idea of reversibility the notion of surrender or 
dedication. In this article it is demonstrated how Patočka’s conception on 
surrender is developed in his idea of the three movements of human 
existence. Moreover, the understanding of intersubjectivity through 
surrender is presented as an important step towards an answer to several 
points of critique on Merleau-Ponty’s views on intersubjectivity, that were 
brought to the fore by Claude Lefort. Finally, in this article several aspects of 
surrender are distinguished in order to give more insight in the functioning 
and effects of the third movement of human life. 
 
Keywords: intersubjectivity, surrender, three movements of human life, 




In his lectures of 1969, entitled Body Community 
Language World, Jan Patočka has given an elaborate 
description of his ideas on bodily existence and intersubjectivity 
(Patočka 1998). One can find a clear influence in these lectures 
of the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, to whom Patočka refers 
several times. Both emphasize the primacy of the body and of 
intersubjective bonds above subjective consciousness. But there 
is also a crucial difference between these two phenomenologists. 
Whereas Merleau-Ponty stresses the tension between the 
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reversibility and divergence of subjects, Patočka describes the 
relation between self and other as a relation of surrender and 
dedication. 
In this text I shall first briefly sketch Merleau-Ponty’s 
view on intersubjectivity and then discuss the criticism it 
evoked in, among others, his pupil Claude Lefort. In addition, 
the main part of my text will deal with Patočka, in order to 
show how in his philosophy solutions might be found that 
tackle the problems that Lefort had recognized in his critical 
reading of Merleau-Ponty. 
 
 
1. Merleau-Ponty on intersubjectivity: reversibility and 
divergence 
 
Merleau-Ponty develops his ideas on intersubjectivity, 
both in Phénoménologie de la Perception and Le Visible et 
l’invisible, in terms of reversibility. Human lives are always 
already intertwined in intersubjectivity and in one world. The 
phenomena do not appear before my consciousness and the 
consciousness of others separately, they appear before us.  Just 
like in the perception by one individual person many 
perspectives slide into one another and are gathered together in 
the phenomenon, in a comparable way the perspectives of 
several subjects slide into each other in one world: 
 
“But we have learned in individual perception not to conceive our 
perspective views as independent of each other; we know that they slip 
into each other and are brought together finally in the thing. In the same 
way we must learn to find the communication between one consciousness 
and another in one and the same world. In reality, the other is not shut 
up inside my perspective of the world, because this perspective itself has 
no definite limits, because it slips spontaneously into the other’s, and 
because both are brought together in one single world in which we all 
participate as anonymous subjects of perception.” (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 
405-406; 1989, 353) 
 
The reversibility that Merleau-Ponty describes here, includes 
both a common world and an unbridgeable difference. This 
divergence is given in the fact that I can never experience the 
feelings and ideas of the other in the same way as he or she 




experiences them. Despite all my sympathy with Paul, I can 
never feel his pain or sorrow, “… simply because Paul is Paul 
and I am myself.” (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 409; 1989, 356) There 
are no definite limits between our perspectives that merge into 
one another, but at the same time our experiences are 
unmistakably different. Within the shared world that 
constitutes everything that occurs to me, there is also an 
inalienable experience of selfhood: 
 
“It is true that I do not feel that I am the constituting agent either of the 
natural or of the cultural world: into each perception and into each 
judgment I bring either sensory functions or cultural settings which are 
not actually mine. Yet although I am outrun on all sides by my own acts, 
and submerged in generality, the fact remains that I am the one by 
whom they are experienced…” (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 411; 1989, 358) 
 
Therefore, in spite of the common roots of all subjects in the 
generality of one world, Merleau-Ponty even speaks of a lived-
through solipsism: “There is here a solipsism rooted in living 
experience [solipsisme vécu] and quite insurmountable.” 
(Merleau-Ponty 1945, 411; 1989, 358) In other words, there is 
not only reversibility and alliance between me and the other, 
but also divergence, deviation, segregation and otherness. Self 
and other emerge from an impersonal world (Madison 1981, 37-
45). 
 
In Le visible et l’invisible Merleau-Ponty emphasizes 
even more the primacy of the flesh and the chiasm out of which 
the other and the self can come to the fore. From this 
‘intercorporality’ of seeing and being seen, touching and being 
touched, the other and the self arise, in such a way that the 
other is not alter ego, but they are two sides of the same world: 
 
“…the chiasm is that: the reversibility – It is through it alone that there 
is passage from the ‘For Itself’ to the For the Other – In reality there is 
neither me nor the other as positive subjectivities. There are two 
caverns, two opennesses, two stages where something will take place – 
and which both belong to the same world, to the stage of Being.” 
(Merleau-Ponty 1964, 317; 1968, 263)1. 
 
 





2. Lefort’s critique 
 
Claude Lefort has criticized this approach of 
intersubjectivity in a lecture that is published as ‘Flesh and 
Otherness’ (Lefort 1990). In a short characterization of 
Merleau-Ponty’s thoughts he sketches the flesh as a 
reversibility that is first of all understood as a form of 
sensibility. Like the body touches and is touched at the same 
time, the flesh is the belonging together of what can only 
afterwards be taken as separate. But the separation is there as 
well. Hence, “the human body is not only sensible to itself, it is 
outside itself, it is a stranger to itself.” (Lefort 1990, 7) Lefort 
discerns a shift of emphasis in Le visible et l’invisible from 
reversibility to what Merleau-Ponty calls ‘dehiscence’, the 
splitting open of phenomena: 
 
“…in his working notes he stresses more and more the phenomenon of 
‘dehiscence’. Thus, what was first announced in terms of overlapping, 
homogeneity, and reversibility seems later to have to be qualified in 
terms of segregation, fission, and alterity.” (Lefort 1990, 8) 
 
Despite this shift in emphasis from reversibility to dehiscence, 
Lefort claims that there are specific elements of difference and 
alterity that are missing in Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of 
intersubjectivity. He discerns three problems, or better said: 
three sides of one problem. 
 
1. The difference between subjects within the intersubjective 
coexistence involves more than the flipside of reversibility in 
lateral exchange. Lefort refers to the relation between a small 
child and an adult. For the child, the adult is not an alter ego, 
but a mediator between the child and the world, a mediator 
who does not stand at the same level. “What we should bring to 
light is the original asymmetry between the experience of the 
infant and that of the adult. For the infant, the other is not 
originally an alter ego.” (Lefort 1990, 9) The infant, as a human 
organism, is usually prepared to see, but before he sees distinct, 




single things, the look of the other opens the world for him, in a 
hierarchical relation: “The other […] gives something to be seen 
from above.” (Lefort 1990, 9-10) 
With reference to Sigmund Freud and Melanie Klein, 
Lefort tries to show that this asymmetry is related to 
distinctions in the realms of danger and morality. Reversibility 
is not only a matter of sense and visibility, but also of eating: 
“Eating supports the impulse to swallow up external being, and 
this impulse goes along with the feeling of being at risk of being 
swallowed up. […] There is a split between the good and the 
bad object.” (Lefort 1990, 10) 
The asymmetry between adult and child is illustrated by 
Lefort with the image of the pointing finger of the adult that 
shows the child its ways in the world. The relation of the infant 
to his parents and other adults is one that is dominated from 
the start by the adults, a domination that will leave its traces, 
even when the child has grown up and become an adult himself. 
“The infant is immediately, and even before coming into the 
world, taken into a web of wishes, expectations and fears of 
which he will never possess the meaning.” (Lefort 1990, 10-11) 
 
2. In the realm of speech and language Lefort discerns the same 
problems. Language is texture of relations and rules in which 
the child learns to find its way, with the help of others, even 
under direction of others. 
 
“How would it be possible to mask the function of the other in the 
initiation of the world of named things? The other gives names, and in a 
certain sense, introduces the child into the sphere of law whenever he 
says ‘this is red, and not yellow’ or ‘this is house, and not a boat’.” (Lefort 
1990, 11) 
 
Even more important, not only names of things are given to the 
child, the child itself is named. 
 
“To be named […] testifies of an original and irreducible transcendence. 
[…] The divergence [écart] between my name and myself does not 
coincide with the divergence between me seer and me visible. The name 
was imprinted on me and at the same time bound to remain outside me, 
above me.” (Lefort 1990, 11) 
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In short, what Lefort misses in Merleau-Ponty’s view of 
intersubjectivity is the idea of the other as the third one, the 
mediator who guides from above the relations of reversibility 
between subject and world. 
 
3. Finally, Lefort mentions that this criticism might help to 
enlighten the difficulties Merleau-Ponty encountered in his 
political analyses. According to Lefort, these political analyses 
lack a comparison of different types of social structures that 
would provide insight in the distinction between modern 
democracy and totalitarianism. (Lefort 1990, 12) These last 
remarks on politics are rather short, so I will not further 
discuss them in detail. 
Matt Dillon, Gary Brent Madison and David Michael 
Levin react on this criticism and try to defend Merleau-Ponty in 
several ways. They all make useful and interesting remarks, 
but, in my point of view, they all seem to miss the main points 
of Lefort’s critique, namely the asymmetry and the morality 
that comes with alterity and with social relations, that is 
inherent in the divergence within reversibility (Dillon 1990; 
Madison 1990; Levin 1990). Probably, using terms like 
‘asymmetry’, ‘morality’ and ‘alterity’ make the reader think of a 
connection with Levinas, 2  but in Patočka’s philosophy these 





In the extended analyses of subjective and intersubjective 
existence in Body Community Language World, Patočka 
elaborates on many ideas of Merleau-Ponty. His view on 
subjectivity is actually very close to Merleau-Ponty. Patočka 
agrees with Merleau-Ponty on the primacy of the body, on the 
original reversibility between subject and world, and also on the 
primacy of the world and of intersubjectivity over against the 
subject. Nevertheless he clearly takes the perspective of the 
subject as his starting point. 
The subject, the I, he writes, is a stream of centrifugal 
energy, always intentionally directed towards its environment. 




This I, a primordial dynamism, as such never appears before 
me. If I reflect upon myself through introspection, I always find 
a ‘me’ that already has changed, that is not anymore the same 
as the original stream of energy. But before this reflection can 
take place, I already know myself, through my relations to the 
other, the Thou. For the I starts as a dynamism, but 
simultaneously the I is also that what this stream of energy 
discovers in return. This stream never really ceases, but  
 
“…in a certain sense this impetus returns to itself because it encounters 
a mirror – in entering the world, in moving away from itself, it 
encounters a place from which further continuation is a return to itself. 
This place is the other being – Thou.” (Patočka 1998, 36) 
 
The way the subject places itself in the world, has the structure 
of the Thou-I. It is not by accident that the Thou is mentioned 
here as first, before the I. For the mirror of the Thou changes 
the anonymous impersonal relations of the subject into a 
personal I, the Thou takes care of my personal recognition. The 
Thou, the other I, is always the main goal of my intentional 
orientations, he is, in Patočka’s words, the focus of my world, its 
entelechy, its teleological idea. And the return to the self 
through the other is the first type of explicit reflection (Patočka 
1998, 51). The analogy with Merleau-Ponty is very apparent 
when Patočka writes of the relation to the other as “… a mutual 
mirroring. I see and I am seen. I integrate this mirroring in 
myself.” (Patočka 1998, 52) 
But then, a few pages further, he makes an addition that 
leads his analysis beyond Merleau-Ponty. The relation Thou-I is 
a mirroring but also more than a mirroring, it changes, or at 
least it can change the subject in a profound way: “The return 
to the self is not analogous to a reflection in a mirror; rather, it 
is a process in which we seek and constitute ourselves, lose 
ourselves, and find ourselves again.” (Patočka 1998, 57) This 
specific characterization of the relation to the other, self-loss 
and finding oneself again, this is what Patočka calls elsewhere 
surrender or devotion. In German texts he uses the word 
Hingabe. Because of this relation of surrender, the life that I 
share with others in intersubjectivity is not a “…mere copying 
but rather mutual enrichment, increase.” (Patočka 1998, 65) 
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This notion of surrender has been further developed by 
Patočka in his idea of the three movements of human life. He 
discerns three main dimensions in human existence, which he 
describes as movements: the movement of rooting or anchoring, 
the movement of self-prolongation and the movement of 
breakthrough or truth. 
 
first movement 
The first movement is the movement of rooting, a belonging to 
the natural and social environment in which we live. We need 
to be accepted and at home in the world and we cannot but 
surrender to this need. Interestingly, Patočka’s description of 
the first movement comprises the relation of adults and 
children that Lefort had asked attention for. Sinking roots is a 
shared movement that begins with the acceptance of a newborn 
baby, but continues when the child is grown up and has entered 
the world of the adults.  The sharing has not changed during 
and after the growing up of the child, but the roles have 
changed: 
 
“The acceptance of the newborn into human warmth compensates for the 
separation of the body, for bodily individuation. Spiritual individuation, 
release into the world of the adults, does not mean leaving the 
instinctual affective moment behind; it is only a reversal of one’s 
situation, a repetition of that movement, though no longer as accepting 
but as giving.” (Patočka 1998, 149) 
 
The different roles that Patočka discerns here between adult 
and child imply the hierarchy in the relations. In the second 
Heretical Essay Patočka also speaks of compensation, with 
reference to the fragment of Anaximander: the compensation of 
giving right (or justice) to each other and putting aside 
injustice. This compensation is understood by Patočka as a 
devotion: “This compensation takes place in all to whom this 
existence is devoted, whom it loves and whom it accepts in 
turn.” (Patočka 1996, 30) The surrender that first passively, 
without knowing it, takes place in the child, is later actively 
performed by the parents and other adults who devote their 
energy to their children in feeding and raising them. In short, 




in this first movement, “humans are beings for others.” 
(Patočka 1998, 177) 
 
second movement 
The second movement contains the dimension of work, the 
dimension in which we have to take action in order to stay 
alive. In this domain our relations to others are characterized 
by self-interest, contracts, concurrence and conflict. But 
surprisingly, in the second Heretical Essay Patočka calls the 
second movement the movement literally the movement of self-
surrender. On the one hand, we may see here a calculated self-
denial that finally aims at a self-interest through rational 
behavior: 
 
“The ideal of the second vital line is the ascetic ideal. Self-extension 
takes place in the context of self-denial, overcoming instinctual, 
immediate desire. Though ultimately it follows an instinctual goal, the 
means is self-control.” (Patočka 1998, 159) 
 
On the other hand, work, which is the main aspect of the 
second movement, has to be understood as work that we do for 
others, which can also be seen as a sort of devotion: “Work is 
essentially this self-disposal of ourselves as being at the 
disposal of others.” (Patočka 1996, 31) Although this last 
interpretation is possible, Patočka seems to have something 
else in mind. The disposal of others is first of all something that 
is necessary to stay alive. We have no choice but to work. “The 
fundamental trait of work, however, is that it is involuntary; we 
accept it under duress, it is hard, it is a burden.” (Patočka 1996, 
31)3 
 
third movement  
Another side of self-surrender, a more ethical one, and perhaps 
even the highest form of surrender, can be found in the third 
movement. In this movement we consciously relate to the world 
as a whole and to our existence as a whole. We start to search 
for a truth that lies beyond the usual opinions, a lasting truth. 
Although we are not able to definitively find such a truth, the 
search for it is essential for our lives. By breaking through the 
supposedly self-evident beliefs, we become aware of our relation 
META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – V (1) / 2013 
22 
 
to the world, which is a relation of opening up, of letting things 
appear. This movement has several moral implications. Since 
our choices, patterns of behavior and worldviews are not self-
evident anymore, we have to give an account of them. With the 
third movement begins our responsibility. Moreover, it shows 
us that our existence is not self-centered, it has to find its goal 
and meaning outside, in relation to others and to the world, in 
relation to being. Here we find the overcoming of self-enclosure. 
“Life is no longer its sole own purpose but […] there is the 
possibility of living for something else.” (Patočka 1996, 37) 
This is self-surrender in its highest form and in the 
ethical meaning of the word; not the calculating postponement 
of self-interest but the overcoming of self-interest, the effort to 
find our highest, moral and responsible self in a radical loss of 
self-interest.4 In this movement we can really give up ourselves, 
lose ourselves and find ourselves again in a life that is devoted 
to what is of higher importance than we ourselves are. The real 
devotion here is an ontological devotion: it can be found in… 
 
“…life on the boundary which makes life an encounter with what there 
is, on the boundary of all that is where this whole remains insistent 
because something quite other than individual entities, interests, and 
realities within it inevitably emerges here.”  (Patočka 1996, 39) 
 
Human life needs to be understood in relation to Being, as 
having a task in its relation to the field of appearance: 
“Humans, the universal beings and beings of the universum, 
are called to things, to give them what they lack, to make that 
encounter possible. […] …human life is a service.” (Patočka 
1998, 170) 
In his Afterword to a new edition of his dissertation, after 
33 years, in 1969, Patočka describes life in the third movement 
as a life in the movement of surrender: 
 
“My being is no longer defined as a being for me but rather as a being in 
self-surrender, a being which opens itself to being, which lives in order 
for things—as well as myself and others—to be, to show themselves as 
what they are. This means: life in self-surrender, life outside oneself, not 
a mere solidarity of interests but a total reversal of interest—I no longer 
live in that which separates and encloses, but rather in that which 
unites and opens, being openness itself.” (Patočka unedited, 189) 





As a surrender or devotion, dedication, Hingabe, to Being, the 
human subject finds the real meaning of its existence in an 
openness to Being, in letting things be, i.e. in its relation to the 
field of appearing. This self-surrender is, literally, a giving up of 
its own singular interests, a giving-oneself-away, a being 
outside of oneself, in the world which is the center of our 
existence. 
Life in dedication and surrender is, in its own way, 
eternal, according to Patočka, because it participates in truth 
and in a community of people that transcend their particular 
interests and self-centeredness. According to Patočka, the 
transcendence in surrender is an essential moment in 
intersubjectivity: 
 
“Life that gives itself up lives outside itself, and the authenticity of this 
‘outside itself’ is attested precisely by what it gives itself up to. It thus 
begets a community of those who understand each other in surrender 
and devotion, and, through the negation of separate centers, cement a 
fellowship of dedication, a fellowship in devoted service, which 
transcends every individual. The goal Husserl meant to attain with his 
phenomenological reduction as a fact achievable in philosophical 
reflection is in reality a result of the communication of existences: their 
transcending into a chain of beings united not merely by an external 
link, of beings which are not mere islands of life in a sea of objectivity, 
but for whom things and objects emerge from the ocean of being in the 
service of which they communicate.” (Patočka unedited, 190) 
 
In a few of his latest texts, Patočka has described this 
dedication and surrender of subjects to the appearance of 
phenomena, their testimony of ontological difference, in terms 
of love:  
 
“Et la compréhension principale demeure : l’Être n’est aucune chose, 
aucun être, mais ce qui ouvre les choses et les êtres, ce qui se les 
rassemble par la force invincible de l’amour ; et la place de l’amour n’est 
pas au milieu des choses et des contenus du monde, mais auprès de 
l’Être immortel. L’Être n’est pas ce que nous aimons mais ce par quoi 
nous aimons, ce qui donne à aimer, sur le fondement de quoi nous 
laissons être les choses ce qu’elles sont, nous voyons leur consistance en 
elles-mêmes et ne les rapportons pas primordialement et par principe à 
nous.” (Patočka 1985) 
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Here we see how Patočka develops, through elaborating on the 
idea of surrender, an ontology of love. It seems that this is one 
of the elements of Patočka’s philosophy that indicate an 
important influence of the Christian tradition. What he writes 
on surrender, dedication and love fits directly in his description 
of the Christian phase of the history of the care of the soul in 
the fifth Heretical Essay. This Christian heritage is 
transformed into a secularized ontology of love, but bears 
unmistakably Christian traces. In other words, if we look at its 
relation to the history of philosophy or the history of ideas, 
Patočka’s philosophy shows to be remarkably different from 
Merleau-Ponty. 
Also in his later work one can recognize how the  
movement of surrender is further developed in the notion of 
sacrifice. For Patočka, sacrifice has become a form of surrender 
that in late modernity, in technological culture, is needed to 
find again this surrender itself as that what makes us human. 
For in a technological culture a gift of love can only be 
understood as leading beyond the calculation that governs the 
appearance of all things. 
In short, in Patočka’s phenomenology surrender means 
in the first movement a mutual accepting of life and of human 
warmth through passive acceptance by infants and an active 
giving by adults; in the second movement a self-surrender that 
aims at self-prolongation; and in the third movement surrender 




4. Surrender in the third movement 
 
If we take a closer look at the passages in which Patočka 
writes on the third movement of human life, and if we develop 
them further with the help of the notion of surrender, we might 
discern several stadia of surrender in this movement: 
First of all it is a surrender to uncertainty, to the 
attitude of asking radical questions that will never be entirely 
answered. Our views of life are uncertain, the quest for truth 
shows us the indeterminacy of Being, and instead of a firm 




foundation we find polemos in our relation to Being/ Being and 
our existence are not given in one clear view – and we have to 
accept this. 
However, we cannot live for a long time in such 
existential uncertainty. We have to return to everyday life and 
make our choices and decisions. Therefore, we have to adhere to 
principles that we can never completely justify with rational 
argumentation, but that we want to cling to. Since we find them 
at the end of our argumentations, as principles that found and 
guide our justifications, without being justified themselves, we 
do not really choose these principles, we are convinced by them. 
This is a second aspect of surrender in the third movement: a 
dedication to convictions and principles that are part of what 
Richard Rorty calls our ‘final vocabulary’ (Rorty 1989). We 
know that others may be convinced by other principles, but still 
we insist that our principles cannot be given up. 
Here we may find the core of the intersubjectivity 
Patočka is looking for and that he referred to with the well 
known but not easy to understand expression ‘solidarity of the 
shaken’. Even though we may not share the same principles 
with our fellow humans, we must be able to understand, accept 
and respect each other in the mutual recognition of being 
shaken. The mutual recognition of surrender and dedication is 
what shapes and develops a rational intersubjectivity on the 
basis of a more basic corporeal intertwining. 
There is perhaps one thing, however, that we can never 
give up, because it is the very precondition of this 
intersubjectivity, i.e. the openness itself towards the Being of 
things, the openness in which we can let phenomena be what 
they are and the way they are. Here we find the political 
relevance of this idea of intersubjectivity. We have to surrender 
to and accept the necessity of openness in our relation to each 
other, to other human beings. This is incompatible with the 
idea of one truth and one political direction that can lead to 
several forms of totalitarianism. 
This political relevance of Patočka’s understanding of 
intersubjectivity – that was, as far as I know, never explicitly 
expressed by himself – may provide what Lefort was looking for 
in his political philosophy and that he missed in Merleau-
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Ponty: i.e. the recognition of openness as the empty center of 
the political order of society, the recognition of openness that 
has to secure the difference between democracy and 
totalitarianism. Of course this principle is not enough to build a 
political philosophy on, but it is an indispensible element of the 





It was the aim of this article to show how Patočka’s idea 
of surrender can be seen as an important addition to Merleau-
Ponty’s understanding of intersubjectivity. The relation 
between self and other has to be understood as emerging from a 
preceding unity that can be named as reversibility, flesh, 
chiasm. This unity is a primordial merging of coherence and 
dehiscence. From the start this reversibility includes hierarchy, 
morality and all kinds of rules. A higher and more developed 
intersubjectivity needs to be reached through a conscious and 
radical questioning and consideration of the traditional forms 
and institutions of these asymmetries and moral values. Such a 
level of intersubjectivity can only be reached if the relation 
between self and other is understood and realized by way of 
surrender and dedication, by overcoming all kinds of self-
interest. 
What Lefort was missing in Merleau-Ponty’s view of 
intersubjectivity, therefore, can be found in Patočka’s 
understanding of it: the asymmetry of the relation between 
children and adults; the specific understanding of moral 
dimensions of this asymmetry and of intersubjectivity as such; 
and finally the political consequences that may be derived from 
the uncertainty that is inherent in the third movement of 
human life and that is directly related to the crucial notion of 













1  For a discussion of the development in Merleau-Ponty’s thought of the 
relation between self and other and the appearance of the other, from La 
Phénoménologie de la Perception to Le visible et l’invisible, see Barbaras 
(1991, 51-58, 277-305). 
2 In the collection of Johnson and Smith (1990, 51-110) this connection is 
discussed in several articles.  
3 Of course there is, in the description in the Heretical Essays, also another 
surrender, the reverse side of every day work, namely the surrender to the 
demonic and orgiastic, the surrender to eros. But however interesting this 
may be, I leave it aside now. 
4 I think it is significant that here, with regard to the shift from the second to 
the third movement, Patočka refers less to Merleau-Ponty and more to 
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